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In the variety of methods and topics, the essays gathered here revolve around the 
problem of the relationship between unity and multiplicity, between individuality and 
collectivity in Spinoza’s thinking. This is a central and crucial issue, both in its specific 
political dimension as well as in its inevitable intersections to which it opens with its 
more exquisitely moral and theoretical side in the philosophy of Spinoza. This issue is 
addressed, in the first place, in relation to the notion of «time», in the perspective of a 
radically and infinitely mobile and modifiable immanence, continuously disassembled 
and reassembled in the multiplicity of single «durations», according to a conception 
that is ideally connected to Lucrezio’s atomistic materialism and the Macchiavellian 
concept of «occasion», contrasting itself frontally with other visions, monistic and serial, 
theological and telelological, both ancient and modern (from Plato and the Stoics to 
Descartes, from Hobbes to Hegel). Still in close contact with Machiavelli and his 
reflection on political action in the contingency of actual reality, the unity-multiplicity 
relationship is revisited in light of the idea of the «multitude», which in Spinoza’s 
Political Treatise does not appear to simply oppose (as does occur, in contrast, in many 
fifteenth and sixteenth century European republican-Machiavellian readings) forced 
and violent political unification carried out by a «tyrant», but instead seems to come 
into play to replace it, to connectively and relatively measure every process of 
aggregation and emancipation: even tyranny, in this way, becomes an expression not of 
the individual and his power but of the collective – albeit in a specific case, an 
expression of one of his weaknesses more than his strength. This is a perspective 
according to which Machiavelli’s extremely «acute» understanding becomes the 
«science of the multitude», comprehension of the action and interaction of the whole of 
individuals comprising a State: the understanding, in other words, beforehand becomes 
political paradigm of the third Spinozian type of knowledge, the highest and most 
adequate, which intuitively proceeds from the universal towards the specific. In partial 
continuity with this approach, the third essay rules out the possibility that one of the 
traditional and most consolidated enunciations of «tolerance» may be attributed to 
Spinoza’s political philosophy, since in this the classical roles of the tolerant (the one, 
the sovereign, able to coerce and command) and the tolerated (the many, the 
governed, in whom greater or lesser «patience» is placed, in the last instance, the 
formal codification, the consistency and essence of imperium) are reversed. Intended, 
not by chance, to conclude the discussion, the fourth paper/essay actually completely 
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reopens it: a master of Spinozian studies - to whom all, even the three authors who 
preceded him, owe much - through an unrelenting analysis, calls into question the 
effective significance of the idea of «multitude», whose valorization he does not 
consider) as the legitimate and credible result of authentic Spinozian instances, but as 
the persistence of nineteenth century suggestions: the continuation of the fascination of 
Nietzschian mysticism of immanence and the lingering tendency, typical of many 
Marxist traditions (but far from the real, true Marx), to mortify individuality. 
 
Structured in this way, the sylloge can seem unusual. Nevertheless – and just because 
of this unusualness – it seems to be endowed with a certain positive emblematicism. 
First and foremost on the level of Spinoza’s extraordinary intellectual accomplishment, 
which even in these limited and minute circumstances emerges in its rich and unitary 
complexity, always steadfast in cataloguing, of which there has so often been the 
temptation to abbreviate and simplify, plunging it alternatively into antiquity or 
modernity, into idealism or materialism, into determinism or freedom, into rationalism 
or mysticism, into individualism or holism. But then – if one could say – also on a 
subjective and personal level of “experience”, on the level of friendships and esteem 
which sustains the impact of confrontation as well as that of dissension, in the common 
consciousness – this is indubitably and authentically Spinozian – that the illusory self-
referencing of «solitude» is for humans among the greatest causes of fragility and 
danger.       
 
